Civil Procedure--Attempt to Defeat Diversity Jurisdiction by Gravely, David R.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 23 Issue 3 Article 6 
1971 
Civil Procedure--Attempt to Defeat Diversity Jurisdiction 
David R. Gravely 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gravely, David R. (1971) "Civil Procedure--Attempt to Defeat Diversity Jurisdiction," South Carolina Law 
Review: Vol. 23 : Iss. 3 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss3/6 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 






This comment will examine the often used practice of assignment
of a portion of one's claim to a citizen of the defendant's state for the
purpose of destroying the required complete diversity of citizenship'
and thus preventing the defendant's attempt to remove 2 his case to a
federal court. Since the ability to bring suit in a federal court and to
exercise the right of removal from a state court are dependent upon the
citizenship of the parties involved, it has long been the practice to add
or subtract parties in order to reach the court of plaintiff's choosing.
Therefore, this device of assignment rests the choice of forum solely
with the plaintiff and defendant's statutory right to remove becomes
"illusory".
3
There is a statute which prevents the collusive invoking of federal
jurisdiction,4 but there is no legislative policy against the avoidance of
federal jurisdiction. However, in the South Carolina federal district
* Carter v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 318 F. Supp. 368 (D.S.C. 1970).
1. Diversity jurisdiction is derived from 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1966) which states:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum value of $10,000, exclusive
of interests and costs and is between (1) citizens of different states; (2)
citizens of a state, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof; and (3)
citizens of different states and in which foreign states or citizens or subjects
thereof are additional parties.
Complete diversity was established in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267
(1806).
2. The right of removal is derived from 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 .(a) (1950) which
states:
[A]ny civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant
.. . to the district court of the United States. . . where such action is
pending.
3. Note, The Assignment Device in Diversity Cases: The Illusory Right of Removal,
35 U. CIN. L. Rav. 33,45 (1966).
4. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1359 (1962) reads:
A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any
party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively
made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.
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courts and other jurisdictions, there seems to be a judicial trend
developing which would also prevent collusion to avoid federal
jurisdiction.
II. BACKGROUND
Three early Supreme Court decisions laid the foundation for and
explained the rationale of allowing the plaintiff to defeat diversity
jurisdiction. The first decision on this issue was Provident Savings Life
Assurance Society v. Ford5 in which the federal court's assumption of
jurisdiction was challenged. In this case the plaintiff had assigned his
entire claim in order to prevent the defendant's removal to the federal
court. The defendant's contention that the assignee was not the real
party in interest was dismissed by the Court which reasoned that the
assignment was not fraudulent, but merely colorable.1 The Supreme
Court, in refusing to assume federal jurisdiction,7 stated:
We know of no instance where the want of consideration in a
transfer, or a colorable transfer, of a right of action from a person
against whom the defendant would have a right of removal to a
person against whom he would not have such right, has been held a
good ground for removing a cause from a state to a federal court.
[I]t may, perhaps, be a good defense to an action in a state
court to show that a colorable assignment has been made to
deprive the United States Court ofjurisdiction; but, as before said,
it would be a defense to the action, and not a ground of removing
that cause into the federal court. 8
The second case, Oakley v. Goodnow,9 went one step further in
holding that the federal statutory scheme gave the court no jurisdiction
to evade a colorable assignment made to defeat diversity.
[N]o authority has as yet been given them [the courts of the United
States] to take jurisdiction of a case by removal from a state court
when a colorable assignment has been made to prevent such a
removal. Under the law as it now stands, resort can only be had to
the state courts for protection against the consequences of such an
encroachment on the rights of a defendant."
5. 114 U.S. 635 (1885).
6. Id. at 640-41.
7. Accord, Carson v. Dunham, 121 U.S. 421 (1887); Leather Manufactures' Bank
v. Cooper, 120 U.S. 778 (1887).
8. 114 U.S. at 641.
9. 118 U.S. 43 (1886).
10. Id. at 45.
[Vol. 23
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Thirdly, the case of Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co." dealt
with the appointment of an out-of-state administrator, which is another
method often used to defeat diversity. In this case the deceased's
widow, as administratrix, brought an action against the defendant, a
Louisiana corporation, in an Oklahoma probate court under a
wrongful death statute. The defendant removed to the district court
whereupon the plaintiff dismissed the action. Subsequently, she
resigned as administratrix and had Mecom, a citizen of Louisiana,
appointed as administrator by the Oklahoma court. Mecom then
brought the action, but defendant was again allowed to remove and
plaintiff's motion to remand was denied. The Supreme Court, in
reversing this denial stated:
[Tihere was no right of removal to the federal court; and it is
immaterial that the motive for obtaining his appointment and
qualification was that he might thus be clothed with a right to
institute an action which could not be so removed on the ground of
diversity of citizenship.
2
There have been no United States Supreme Court cases dealing
with the use of a partial assignment for the purpose of destroying
diversity. The first 13 court to consider the partial assignment device did
so in the case of Ridgeland Box Mfg. Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co.'" The
assigned amount in this action was only one one-hundredth of
plaintiff's claim, but the South Carolina Supreme Court held that this
assignment was not an evasion but an avoidance of federal
jurisdiction." The Ridgeland court further stated:
[E]ven if the parties were joined for the purpose of defeating
removal, if they really be proper parties and have legitimate
standing in the court the attempt of removal may be defeated
irrespective of the intent and purpose of the plaintiff."
Another South Carolina case 7 has gone even further in discussing
II. 284 U.S. 183 (1931); See 45 HARV. L. Rav. 743 (1932); 41 YAu L.J. 639
(1932).
12. 284 U.S. at 190.
13. 2 S.C.L.Q. 89,90 (1949).
14. 82 F. Supp. 274 (D.S.C. 1949); accord, Heape v. Sullivan, 233 F. Supp. 127
(D.S.C. 1964); Doremus v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 242 S.C. 123, 130 S.E.2d 370
(1963).
15. 82 F. Supp. at 276.
16. Id.
17. King v. McMillan, 252 F. Supp. 390 (D.S.C. 1966).
1971]
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the plaintiff's ability to defeat federal jurisdiction by assignment of one
one-hundredth of his claim.
This court cannot, will not, on the facts and pleadings now before
it, invade the sanctity of the approval Order, or pierce the veil of
authority erected by the signature thereon. If any fraud or
collusion exists in connection with the assignment, the state court
is the proper forum for pursuit of same."
III. THENEWTREND
Although the practice of assignment to defeat diversity
jurisdiction seems accepted, many legal scholars have questioned the
fairness of allowing the plaintiff absolute choice of his forum. The
protection, which those who question the fairness of assignments
believe the state courts should have afforded the defendant, has been
proposed by section 1307(b) of the American Law Institute's federal
legislation which reads:
Whenever an object of a sale, assignment, or other transfer of the
whole or any part of any interest in a claim or any other property
has been to enable or to prevent the invoking of federal jurisdiction
.. . jurisdiction of a civil action shall be determined as if such
sale, assignment or other transfer had not occurred. The word
'transfer' as used in this section includes the appointment of a
trustee, receiver, or other fiduciary, or of any other person to hold
or receive interests of any kind, whether made by private persons
or by a court of any other official body."
In the American Law Institute's commentary for section 1307 the
following thought provoking proposals are noted:
So long as federal diversity jurisdiction exists, however, the need
for its assertion may well be greatest when the plaintiff tries
hardest to defeat it. The plaintiff who chooses to sue a non-citizen
defendant in a state court may be motivated by the hope that the
out-of-state defendant will be at a substantial disadvantage in that
court, and the likelihood of such motivation increases with the
lengths to which the plaintiff will go to prevent removal to a
federal forum. Although the magnitude of the problem cannot be
determined, the cases leave no doubt that it exists, and the
enactment of remedial legislation may not only resolve particular
18. Id. at 391-392.
19. ALl, STUDY OF THE DivisION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 21-22 (Official Draft, Sept. 25, 1965).
[Vol. 23
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cases when they arise but may also tend to discourage resort tO
such devices at the time that suit is brought."
Professor James W. Moore discussing the foregoing American
Law Institute proposed federal legislation comments: "The proposals
. . . are good ones: But We -respectfully suggest that the federal courts
should not await legislative action to cure an erronebus doctrine which
has been evolved by the federal eourts2' 21'A-finoher corhmeit by
Professor Moore states: "[l1f the federal courts will not protect their
jurisdiction from fraudulent evasion it it not likely that state courts will
do it for them."' '2 The recent Supreme Court case of Kramer, v.
Caribbean Mills, Inc.?2 gave force to professor Moore's warning by
holding that "the existence of federal jurisdiction is a matter of federal,
not state law.""
The first courtto break with precedent and follow the views stated
above was a district court of Maine in the case of Gentle v. Lamb-
Weston 1nc35 In this case a one one-hundredth of the plaintiff's claim
was assigned to a lawv scho6 cl~slmate of the' pl intiff's attfney for
the sole purpose of'destroying diversity jurisdiction, The distiict court
did not allow the plaintiff to remand to the state, court andheld such an
assignment did not destroy federal diversity jurisdiction., The Gentle
court stated that Prbvident12 did not apply, because it dealt with
assignment of an entire claim whereas in' Gentle 'only a partial
assignment was made.2 7 The court also distinguished Mecom s by
stating that Mecom involved, not a colorable assignment, but the
appointment of an administrator.2 9 The district court of Maine
concluded its decision with this statement by Judge Gignoux:
[T]he essential diversity of citizenship of the parties at bar has not
been vitiated by plaintiff's sham transaction. Were the Court to
hold otherwise,- it could be by acquiescence a party to the-
20. Id. at 104-05.
21. 3A 3. MooRE, Federal Practice § 11.05[2], at 156 (2d ed. 1969)-.
22. Id. at 154.
23. 394 U.S. 823 (1969).
24. Id. at 829.
25. 302 F. Supp. 161 (D. Me. 1969); See 83 HARV. L. Rav. 465 (1969); 15 VILL. L.
REV. 497 (1970).
26. 114 U.S. 635 -(1885).-
27. 302 F. Supp. at 164.
28. 284 U.S. 183 (1931).
29. 302 F. Supp. at 164. This distinction was stated in Kramer v. Caribbean Mills,
Inc., 394 U.S. 823, 827 (1969).
1971]
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fraudulent avoidance of its jurisdiction and the substantial
frustration of defendant's constitutional and statutory rights. This
it declines to be.30
The Gentle court obviously took this strong position in a belief
that allowing partial assignments to defeat diversity jurisdiction was
fraudulent and should no longer be condoned by the federal courts. It
seemed, however, that other federal courts were not so willing to correct
this erroneous doctrine.
In the South Carolina case of Arant v. Stover,3 decided five
months after Gentle, the district court was presented with a factual
situation which again involved the assignment of one one-hundredth of
the plaintiff's claim for the purpose of avoiding federal jurisdiction.
District Judge Hemphill in failing to accept the Gentle rationale stated:
The conclusion is that the Fourth Circuit now frowns on the forum
shopping practiced by invoking federal jurisdiction through
artificial or collusive means. Whether the brows of that mighty
court will, at some later date, be furrowed by concern over forum
avoidance by the same practices this court does not predict ...
When it is used to defeat diversity jurisdiction, the motive will not
be inquired into, and absent some Act of Congress not presently
foreseeable, the federal court will not look behind the appointment
for the purpose of grasping jurisdiction. This, of course, in no way
preempts the state courts.
After all, it is rather old-fashioned, but this court is a court of
stare decisis.32
IV. THE CARTER DECISION
Almost one year from the date of the decision in Arant, the South
Carolina district court was presented with another opportunity to
follow the Gentle decision in the case of Carter v. Seaboard Coast Line
Railroad Co.Y This time, with Judge Russell deciding the case, the
district court chose to accept the Gentle rationale and became a leader
in the trend for protection of federal jurisdiction based upon diversity
of citizenship.
30. 302 F. Supp. at 166-167.
31. 307 F. Supp. 144 (1969).
32. Id. at 151-152.
33. 318 F. Supp. 368 (D.S.C. 1970).
[Vol. 23
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The action arose in a tort claim against the defendant railroad, a
Virginia company, for injuries sustained in a railroad collision. In the
application of the plaintiff, guardian ad litem of his minor son, for
authority to execute the assignment, he stated that his purpose was "to
retain jurisdiction in Colleton County" because he believed "that a
more favorable verdict might be rendered by a jury coinposed of
citizens of the home county of your Petitioner and the said minor."u
Shelton, a resident of Virginia, was- offered and accepted one one-
hundredth interest in plaintiff's cause of action in order to defeat
federal jurisdiction. The plaintiff than mailed Shelton the proper form
of assignment and a check for one-hundred dollars which the letter
explained was "for your assistance in this matter."
Judge Russell relied on the Krameras decision for the propostion
that the question of federal jurisdiction would not be bound by the state
court's determination of the validity of the assignment. 3 Having
determined to investigate the basis of the assignment, the Carter court
noted that Gentle was a well-reasoned opinion that had been approved
by the commentators.37 The court then stated language from the case of
Wecker v. National Enameling and Stamping Co. 3 which was also
quoted in the Gentle decision:
While the plaintiff, in good faith, may proceed in the state courts
upon a cause of action which he alleges to be joint, it is equally
true that the federal courts should not sanction devices intended to
prevent a removal to a federal court where one has that right, and
should be equally vigilant to protect the right to proceed in the
federal court as to permit the state courts, in proper cases, to
retain their own jurisdiction.3'
Accepting this power to look behind the assignment, the Carter
court determined that "the motive of the transferor is an important
consideration in determining whether the transfer actually was real,
complete and bona fide."'" Six factors were outlined by the court which
34. Id. at 370.
35. 394 U.S. 823 (1969).
36. 318 F. Supp. at 371-372.
37. 318 F. Supp. at 372 citing 83 HARv. L. REv. 465 (1969); 15 VIL. L. REv. 499
(1970); 3A J. Moore, Federal Practice § 17.05 [2], at 156 (2d ed. 1969).
38. 204 U.S. 176 (1907).
39. Id. at 185-186.
40. 318 F. Supp. at 373 citing Amar v. Garnier Enterprises, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 211,
216 (C.D. Cal. 1966). See 83 HARv. L. REv. 465, 473 (1969) which suggests that "it
might be preferable to ignore the citizenship of the transferee only when the transferor
would not have made the transfer but for its effect on federal jurisdiction."
1971]
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ledthem to the findingof a sham assignment and joinder, they were:
(!) no present, consideration for lthe assignment; (2), the assignee
acquired no, real rights in the cause of action; (3) the assignee was not to
be consulted-about, a settlement;; (4) theassignee expectedno control
over'the acti~nj (5) theassigneeexpressed complete indifference to the
subject;,pnd (6) the.assigne, was actually bqing employed and paid to
permit,Ithejuse of hisnameas.a co-plaintiff," The Cartercourt found
that it Wptld be "inconceivable" to allow such a sham when its stated
purpose, was to deny the defendant "the very right ,which the diversity
jprisdiction-pf this court was intended to secure. '" 2
V, CoI~c&usioN
:Judge Russell concluded his opinion, in Carter by noting the
conflictof decisions on the avoidance of federal diversity jurisdiction iti
the various .federal, courtsj He contdnded that, in order to resolvethis
conflict, an interlocutory appeal4 3 would be granted and because of the
importance of the. issue :involved, such appeal would be allowed without
the pxepayment, of fees, and costs. The plaintiff chose, however, not to
exercise, this 'granted privilege to take an interlocutory appeal and
therefore the conflict will have to be finallydetermined at some later
date.
The ffect 'of'the Carter decision 'on the 'practicin'g attotney may
have beel predicted by'Professor Field in his discussion"0'f the
American Law Institute's proposed federal legislation:
To those of you 'who' 'iabitually tepre'sent' plaintiffs in, foi
example, personal injury cases, it must 'cme as! a shock even to
suggestthat you be depyried of a choice which you always have
4. 318 F.Supp. at 374.*42. Yt : ...
'43: 28'U:S.C.A. ' 1292 (b) (1966) states:
When a. district-judge, in making in-a civil- action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order
involves a controlling question of law as to which 'ther 'is substantiai
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal froni the
order may fiafdrially advance' th6 ullifiate termination of the litigation, he
shall so sfate' in wrftin'tiii s' ihhl&der. TIe Codrt' of Appels may
thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be takeri from such order,
if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the orde'r:
Ph.o ided, however, that application for an 'appeal hereunder shall not stay
tprbceedings in the distict court unless the district'jUdge or the Court of
-:Appeals'or a judge thereof shall so order.
[Voh' ,23'
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-had, and.have tried to exeicise, as I always did, in aloariicul~rc'ase'
in the way best calculated to aid your client's cause."
Perhaps before the Carter decision the attorney who has attempted
to choose hig forum 'by a-sham assignmentwould be'"shocked" if his
forum were denied him, but he no longer should express such sentiment
after Carter. It is this writer's opinion that the Carter court is to be
commended for its attempt to correct -an erroneous doctrine. The
United States Supreme-Court will eventually have to balance the
theory that the Carter decision represents against the possibility of
overburdening the federal courts dockets and makethe final
determination of this issue.
DAVID R: GRAVELY
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